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Abstract
This paper presents a model of partnership formation. A set of agents wants to
conduct some business or other activities. Agents may act alone or seek a partner
for cooperation and need in the latter case to consider with whom to cooperate and
how to share the pro¯t in a collaborative and competitive environment. We pro-
vide necessary and su±cient conditions under which an equilibrium can be attained.
In equilibrium, the partner formation and the payo® distribution are endogenously
determined. Every agent realizes his full potential and has no incentive to deviate
from either staying independent or from the endogenously determined partner and
payo®. The partnership formation problem contains the classical assignment market
problem as a special case.
Keywords: Partnership formation, equilibrium, indivisibility, assignment market.
JEL classi¯cation: C62, C72, D02.
1 Introduction
Partnership is one of the most common and fundamental relation patterns in society.
There is a set of agents who wish to conduct business or some other economic activities.
Each agent may act alone or seek a partner for cooperation. When an agent acts as a
sole proprietor, he gains a certain payo® by himself, which could be his outside option.
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1When an agent cooperates with another agent, they obtain a joint payo® and this value
has to be divided between the two partners. Di®erent partners generate di®erent joint
payo®s and thus may lead to a di®erent payo® share for an agent. In this collaborative
and competitive environment, each agent has to evaluate what is more pro¯table, acting
alone or seeking a partner. In the latter case, he has to decide with whom to cooperate
and how to share the joint payo® in a satisfactory way. We may imagine that after an
initial period of negotiation and bargaining, a number of partners and independents will be
formed. Under proper circumstances, this process will reach an equilibrium state in which
every agent is satis¯ed in the sense that no further more favorable deals could be obtained.
In equilibrium, all agents realize their full potential and have no incentive to deviate from
either staying independent or cooperating with the endogenously determined partner.
Our analysis is closely related to the models on assignment markets studied by Koop-
mans and Beckmann (1957), Shapley and Shubik (1972), Shapley and Scarf (1974), Craw-
ford and Knoer (1981), Kelso and Crawford (1982), Svensson (1983), Quinzii (1984),
Kaneko and Yamamoto (1986), and Yamamoto (1987). In their classic papers, Koop-
mans and Beckmann (1957) and Shapley and Shubik (1972) investigate assignment mar-
kets from the viewpoint of equilibrium theory and cooperative game theory, respectively.
In such markets, there are many buyers and sellers, and transactions are bilateral, namely,
bring together a buyer and a seller of a single commodity. By means of duality theory
in linear programming it is shown that the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors is a
nonempty lattice and coincides with the core. Shapley and Scarf (1974) consider a swap
market model without monetary transfers and show the existence of a core allocation.
Svensson (1983), Quinzii (1984), Kaneko and Yamamoto (1986), and Yamamoto (1987)
extend the models of Koopmans and Beckmann (1957), Shapley and Shubik (1972) by
allowing nonlinear utilities in both money and items.
Crawford and Knoer (1981) propose a price adjustment process for the assignment
markets studied by Koopmans and Beckmann (1957), Shapley and Shubik (1972) and
prove that their process converges to an equilibrium. Kelso and Crawford (1982) examine
a job assignment model in which each ¯rm can hire many workers but each worker is
allowed to work only at one ¯rm. They prove through a salary adjustment process that
there exists an equilibrium, if every ¯rm views all workers as substitutes. This latter
condition is called gross substitutes and has been widely used in auction, matching and
housing models, see for instance, Roth and Sotomayor (1990), Gul and Stacchetti (1999,
2000), Milgrom (2000), Ausubel (2006), Sun and Yang (2006), and Ostrovsky (2008).
This paper presents a new model, the partnership formation problem that subsumes
and extends the assignment models studied by Koopmans and Beckmann (1957), Shapley
and Shubik (1972), and Crawford and Knoer (1981). In these assignment models the role
2of an agent is exogenously given and each agent is either a buyer (¯rm) or a seller (worker).
So, all agents are exogenously split into two disjoint groups. Agents in the same group
do not have any involvement with each other and cannot work together as partners. In
the current model, the role of an agent need not be exogenously given and each agent
may stay alone or work together with someone else. Precisely, because it is possible for
an agent to form a partnership with anyone else, this creates not only more opportunities
for agents to form partners but also more obstacles to cooperate. We provide necessary
and su±cient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in the partnership formation
problem. Second, more importantly, we give a complete characterization of the set of
solutions to the problem and o®er a general su±cient condition. The condition is always
satis¯ed by the assignment market models, and so it explains why the assignment models
always possess an equilibrium.
In the partnership formation problem, permitted coalitions only consist of at most two
individuals. Simple as they are, such coalitions are compelling, relatively easy to form,
and widely observed in real life. For example, most transactions, trade, and merger occur
bilaterally. Furthermore, conditions for equilibrium existence are rather mild and thus
can be easily satis¯ed. In addition, an analysis on partnership formation may yield useful
insights into many practical situations how stable partnerships can be built and such an
analysis is also a necessary step to the study of more general coalition formation problems.
From a di®erent perspective, the following three papers deal with the latter problem. Hart
and Kurz (1983) examine a general coalition formation problem. Assuming that players'
prospects in various coalition structures are evaluated by a coaliton structure value, they
study stable coalition structures using a strategic form game. Aumann and Myerson (1988)
investigate endogenous formation of cooperation structure under which players' payo®s
follow the Myerson value, i.e., the Shapley value in graph games. Qin (1996) considers a
cooperation-formation game in which players choose independently with whom they wish
to cooperate in a given coalitional game, and players' payo®s are speci¯ed by a solution
imposed on the coalitional game. He shows how cooperation evolves under best-response
and ¯ctitious-play learning processes.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. In
Sections 3 we establish all existence results. In Section 4 we conclude.
2 The model
Suppose there are n agents and let N = f1;2;:::;ng denote the set of agents. Each agent
wishes to engage in a business activity and seeks a partner to cooperate or acts alone. If
two agents i and j in N, j 6= i, cooperate, they make a total payo® of v(fi;jg). The value
3v(fi;jg) may di®er for di®erent pairs i and j. If agent i 2 N acts alone, he will have a
payo® of v(fig). We call v(¢) the value function. For any positive integer k, let Ik denote
the set f1;¢¢¢;kg.
De¯nition 2.1 An assignment on N is a partition P = fU1;¢¢¢;Ukg of N satisfying
that jUhj · 2 for every h 2 Ik.
When, for an assignment P = fU1;¢¢¢;Ukg on N, jUhj = 2 for some h 2 Ik, we say
that the two agents in Uh are partner of each other or are being matched in P, and when
jUhj = 1, we say that the single agent in Uh is a sole proprietor or an independent in P.
An assignment is a complete matching if every agent has a partner. A payo® vector is a
vector r 2 I R
n with ri the payo® or revenue of player i 2 N.
In this economic environment, while bearing in mind that any other agent j could be
both his partner and competitor, each agent i 2 N has to contemplate whether to act
alone or seek a partner and how to share the joint payo® in case of cooperation. If agent
i acts alone, he will get a payo® of v(fig). An agreement or contract between agents i
and j would specify how the joint payo® v(fi;jg) should be divided when the agreement is
signed by both agents who consent to be partner of each other. Of course, a rational agent
i will not rush to form a partnership with another agent j merely because agent j could
o®er him immediately a payo® share higher than his own value v(fig). He will instead try
to squeeze payo® gain as much as possible from any other agent and ultimately enter a
partnership with someone until he has contented himself that no better contracts could be
obtained with someone else. We look for an equilibrium state in which every agent will
be satis¯ed with staying independent or cooperating with a speci¯c partner and with his
payo® share and therefore has no incentive to deviate. This problem is called the partner
formation problem and is denoted by (N;v).
De¯nition 2.2 An allocation (P;r) for the partner formation problem (N;v) consists
of an assignment P on N and a payo® vector r 2 I R
n satisfying that ri = v(fig) if agent
i 2 N is an independent in P and rj + rh = v(fj;hg) if agents j 2 N and h 2 N are
partners of each other in P.
An allocation is therefore an assignment and a payo® vector such that the payo® of a
sole proprietor is equal to his own value and if two agents are matched they get a total payo®
equal to their joint value. The following equilibrium concept yields for each partnership
formation problem a stable set of allocations.
De¯nition 2.3 An equilibrium for the partner formation problem (N;v) is an alloca-
tion (P ¤;r¤) satisfying that r¤
i ¸ v(fig) for every i 2 N and r¤
j + r¤
h ¸ v(fj;hg) for every
j;h 2 N, j 6= h.
4An allocation is an equilibrium if every agent receives a payo® at least equal to the value
when he is an independent and every pair of agents receives a total payo® at least equal to
the value they get when they are matched. So, no agent has an incentive to deviate from
being an independent or from the endogenously determined partner and payo®.
De¯nition 2.4 An assignment ¹ P = f¹ U1;¢¢¢; ¹ Ukg on N is socially optimal for the







for any assignment P = fU1;¢¢¢;Ulg on N.
The next lemma shows that an equilibrium assignment is socially optimal.
Lemma 2.5 If an allocation (P ¤;r¤) is an equilibrium for the partner formation prob-
lem (N;v), then the assignment P ¤ is socially optimal.
Proof. Let P ¤ = fU¤
1;¢¢¢;U¤
kg and take any assignment P = fU1;¢¢¢;Ulg. Let K =






























This shows that the equilibrium assignment P ¤ is socially optimal. 2
The following example shows that an equilibrium allocation may not always exist.
There are three agents with payo®s given by v(fig) = 0 for i = 1;2;3, v(f1;2g) = 3,
v(f1;3g) = 5, v(f2;3g) = 3. It is easy to see that the assignment P = ff1;3g;f2gg is the
unique socially optimal assignment. It is su±cient to consider the allocation (P;r) where
r = (r1;r2;r3) = (r1;0;5 ¡ r1) with r1 ¸ 0. Then r1 + r2 < 3 = v(f1;2g) if r1 < 3 and
r2 + r3 < 3 = v(f2;3g) if r1 > 2. This demonstrates that (P;r) cannot be an equilibrium.
In the classical assignment problem as studied by Koopmans and Beckmann (1957),
Shapley and Shubik (1972), Crawford and Knoer (1981), there are two types of agents: a
group N1 of buyers (¯rms) and a group N2 of sellers (workers). When a buyer i 2 N1 and a
seller j 2 N2 cooperate, they can achieve a value of v(fi;jg). When each agent i 2 N1[N2
acts independently, he gets a payo® of v(fig). As will be shown in Section 3, this problem
can be formulated as a special case of the partnership formation problem.
53 Existence results
In this section we state conditions under which the partnership formation problem has







i2U ri ¸ v(U); 8U µ N; jUj · 2:






l6=h ¸fh;lg = 1; 8h 2 N
¸U ¸ 0;8U µ N; jUj · 2:
The following theorem establishes an intimate relation between the partnership forma-
tion problem and an integer linear programming problem.
Theorem 3.1 The partnership formation problem has an equilibrium if and only if the
dual linear programming problem (D) has an integer optimal solution.
Proof. Let ¸U¤
1 = 1, ¢¢¢, ¸U¤
k = 1, ¸U = 0 for all other U µ N, jUj · 2, constitute an




i j · 2 for all i 2 Ik. By the n equality constraints of (D), every h 2 N appears in
U¤
1;¢¢¢;U¤
k exactly once. This implies that P ¤ = fU¤
1;¢¢¢;U¤
kg is a partition of N and thus
an assignment on N. By the well-known duality theorem of linear programming theory
(see Dantzig (1963)) and since both (P) and (D) have feasible solutions, the minimal value




the dual problem (D). So, there is an optimal solution r¤ = (r¤
1;¢¢¢;r¤







i ). By the complementarity theorem of linear programming









j ¸ v(U) for any U ½ N, jUj · 2. This shows that (P ¤;r¤) is an equilibrium.
Suppose that (P ¤;r¤) is an equilibrium with assignment P ¤ = fU¤
1;¢¢¢;U¤
kg. By de¯-






i ). We will show that
Pk
i=1 v(U¤
i ) is the minimal value of the primal problem (P).
Let K = fU¤
i j jU¤
i j = 1;i 2 Ikg and L = fU¤
i j jU¤
i j = 2; i 2 Ikg. Take any feasible
solution r = (r1;¢¢¢;rn) of (P). Because ri ¸ v(fig) for every i 2 N and rj +rh ¸ v(fj;hg)
















6Hence, by the duality theorem and since both (P) and (D) have feasible solutions, the
maximal value of the dual problem (D) is equal to
Pk
i=1 v(U¤
i ). De¯ne ¸U¤
1 = 1;¢¢¢;¸U¤
k = 1,
and ¸U = 0 for all other U µ N, jUj · 2. Then the complementarity theorem implies that
these parameters yield an integer optimal solution of the dual problem (D). 2
The theorem gives a necessary and su±cient condition under which an equilibrium
exists. We now give a more natural su±cient condition under which an equilibrium exists.
A sequence S = (i1;¢¢¢;il) of l di®erent elements of N is a proper ordering if i1 < ij, for all
j > 1, and i2 < il when l ¸ 3. For i;j 2 N, i 6= j, let M(i;j) = v(fi;jg)¡v(fig)¡v(fjg)
be the marginal value of i and j of becoming partners.
Assumption 3.2 For any proper ordering S = (i1;¢¢¢;il) with l odd and l ¸ 3, it holds
that (i) there exists some j, 1 · j · l, such that
M(ij¡1;ij) + M(ij;ij+1) < M(ij¡1;ij+1);
or (ii) there exist j and h between 1 and l with j ¸ h + 2 such that
M(ih;ih+1) + M(ij;ij+1) < M(ih;ij+1) + M(ih+1;ij);
where k ¡ 1 = l when k = 1 and k + 1 = 1 when k = l.
This assumption says intuitively that, for any (proper) ordering of the agents with odd
length, there is some agent with respect to whom the marginal value of his two neighbors
in the ordering of becoming partners exceeds the total marginal values of them of becoming
partners with him, and if there is not such an agent there are two nonconsecutive agents
in the ordering with respect to whom the total marginal values of becoming partners with
the successor in the ordering of the other exceeds the total marginal value of becoming
partners with their own successor in the ordering. Under this assumption we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.3 Under Assumption 3.2 the partnership formation problem (N;v) has an
equilibrium.
To prove the theorem, we need to introduce an auxiliary result concerning the structure
of the set W of feasible solutions to the dual linear programming problem (D). Clearly, W
is a nonempty bounded polyhedron and is therefore a polytope in I R
m with m = 1
2n(n¡1).
An element x of I R
m will be denoted by
x = (xf1g;xf2g;¢¢¢;xfng;xf1;2g;¢¢¢;xf1;ng;xf2;3g;¢¢¢;xf2;ng;:::;xfn¡2;ng;xfn¡1;ng):
Let C be the family of collections C = fS1;¢¢¢;Skg of proper orderings on N with
Sh = (ih
1;¢¢¢;ih
lh), h 2 Ik, satisfying that fT1;¢¢¢;Tkg is a partition of N, where Th =
7fih
1;¢¢¢;ih
lhg, h 2 Ik. For such C 2 C, the vector q(C) 2 I R
m is de¯ned by, for all h 2 Ik,
qTh(C) = 1 if lh = 1 or 2, qfih
j;ih
j+1g(C) = 1
2 for j = 1;¢¢¢;lh if lh ¸ 3, where j + 1 = 1
when j = lh, and qU(C) = 0 for all other U µ N, jUj · 2. Clearly, q(C) is an element of
W for any C 2 C. Finally, let C0 be the subfamily of collections C = fS1;¢¢¢;Skg in C of
proper orderings on N with odd length or length equal to 2.
The next result gives a complete and useful characterization of the polytope W and
also presents a new class of polytopes whose vertices have components with values of only
0, 1
2, and 1. It tells us the precise structure of the polytope W and thus enables us to know
how to achieve an integer optimal solution to the problem (D) and thus an equilibrium to
the partnership formation problem.
Lemma 3.4 The points q(C), C 2 C0, are all the vertices of the polytope W.
Proof. The polytope W is equal to the set
fx 2 I R
m j Ax = e(N); x ¸ 0g;
where A is an n£m-matrix with Uth column equal to AU =
P
i2U e(i) for U ½ N, jUj · 2,
with e(i), i 2 N, the ith unit vector in I R
n, and e(N) =
Pn
i=1 e(i). We ¯rst show that for
every C 2 C0 the point q(C) is a vertex of W. So, let C = fS1;¢¢¢;Skg be a collection of
proper orderings on N with Sh = (ih
1;¢¢¢;ih
lh), h 2 Ik, satisfying for all h 2 Ik that lh is odd
or equal to 2. Let the matrix B be de¯ned as follows. For h 2 Ik, the matrix B contains
column Afih
1g if Sh = (ih
1), the two columns Afih
1;ih
2g and Afih
2g if Sh = (ih
1;ih
2), and the lh
columns Afih
j ;ih
j+1g for j = 1;¢¢¢;lh, where j + 1 = 1 when j = lh. Clearly, the matrix B is
a square matrix. Since lh is odd whenever lh > 2, the matrix B is of full rank. Moreover it
holds that q(C) = B¡1e(N). Therefore, the matrix B is a feasible basis matrix and q(C)
is a vertex of W.
To prove the converse, take any feasible basis matrix B = (AU1;:::;AUn) of the matrix
A, so x = B¡1e(N) ¸ 0. Suppose there is a row in B with only one element equal to one
and let this element correspond to the Uth column of the matrix A. Then at the basic
solution x corresponding to basis matrix B it must hold that xU = 1. Let H be equal to
N. If U = fi1g for some i1 2 H, perform a singleton-elimination: de¯ne sequence S = (i1),
delete i1 from H, and delete from the matrix B the row indexed by i1 and the column
indexed by U. If U = fi1;i2g for some i1, i2 2 H, where without loss of generality i1 < i2,
perform a pair-elimination: de¯ne sequence S = (i1;i2), delete from the set H both indices
i1 and i2, and delete from the matrix B the two rows indexed by i1 and i2 and any column
indexed by some U0 containing i1 or i2 or both. Since xfi1;i2g = 1 it holds that xfi1;jg = 0
for all j 2 H, j 6= i2, and xfh;i2g = 0 for all h 2 H, h 6= i1.
This singleton- and pair-elimination of indices from H and rows and columns of B is
continued until no row of the remaining B is left that contains only one 1. In this way
8a family of sequences of one or two elements of N being a partition of the set N n H is
generated. We now prove that in each step of the elimination process the reduced matrix
B has full column-rank. By de¯nition the initial matrix B is regular and therefore has full
column-rank. Clearly, by a singleton-elimination the new matrix B has full column-rank
again, because the column and the row of B being deleted are both unit vectors with a 1
as common element. At a pair-elimination step, two rows and one or more columns of B
are deleted. If more than one column is deleted from B, then, for the two rows that are
deleted, we have that one row is a unit vector and its 1 belongs to a column that is deleted,
and from the other row all ones belong to columns that are also deleted. Therefore the
remaining matrix B must have full column-rank. If only one column is deleted, the two
rows that are deleted are identical unit vectors. Since B has full column-rank and two rows
are identical, B must have at least one row more than columns and the remaining columns
still have full rank and therefore also the new matrix B.
After the singleton- and pair-elimination process the remaining matrix B has full
column-rank and therefore its number of columns is at most equal to its number of rows.
Moreover, each row of B has at least two ones, while by de¯nition every column has at
most two ones. This can only be the case if the matrix B is a square matrix, has full rank,
and every row and column of B has precisely two ones. Let i1 be the smallest index in
the remaining index set H, then there exist j and h in H such that fi1;jg and fi1;hg are
indices of columns of B. Notice that j 6= h because B has full rank. Take i2 = j if j < h
and i2 = h if j > h. Now there must exist a chain fi1;i2g;¢¢¢;fil¡1;ilg;fil;i1g of indices
of columns of the matrix B for some l ¸ 3. Next a chain-elimination is performed: de¯ne
sequence S = (i1;¢¢¢;il), delete from the set H the indices i1;¢¢¢;il, and delete from B
the l rows indexed by i1;¢¢¢;il and the l columns indexed by the indices of the chain. We
repeat this chain-elimination on the remaining H and B until the index set H has become
empty. Clearly, any sequence S = (i1;¢¢¢;il) obtained at a chain-elimination step is a
proper ordering with l ¸ 3. We still have to prove that S has odd length. Suppose that S
has even length, then the columns of the initial matrix B indexed by fi1;i2g, ¢¢¢, fil¡1;ilg,
fil;i1g are linearly dependent. This contradicts the fact that the matrix B has full rank.
For each proper ordering S = (i1;¢¢¢;il) obtained in a chain-elimination step, it holds at
the solution x that xfih;ih+1g = 1
2 for all h 2 Il, where h + 1 = 1 when h = l.
Let C be the complete collection of proper orderings obtained at any singleton-, pair-
and chain-elimination step. Then C is an element of C0 and q(C) = B¡1e(N). Since the
matrix B is any feasible basis, this implies that every vertex of W is equal to q(C) for some
C 2 C0, which completes the proof. 2
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 3.3. In the proof, two basic ideas will be used. That
is, case (i) of Assumption 3.2 implies that for the players i1;¢¢¢;il in the chain induced by
9the sequence S = (i1;¢¢¢;il), they can do better by breaking the chain into a single player
ij and linking players ij¡1 and ij+1 to form a new sub-chain. Case (ii) of the assumption
implies that for the players i1;¢¢¢;il in the chain induced by the sequence S = (i1;¢¢¢;il),
they can do better by breaking the chain into two sub-chains. The chain is broken between
players ij and ij+1 and between ih and ih+1 and then player ij is linked to player ih+1 to
form one sub-chain and player ij+1 is linked to player ih to form another sub-chain. In
both cases the sub-chains have smaller length than the original chain.
Proof of Theorem 3.3: Suppose the problem has no equilibrium, then the dual
linear programming problem has only non-integer optimal solutions. By Lemma 3.4 there
exists a vertex q(C), C 2 C0, solving the dual problem (D), where C = fS1;¢¢¢;Skg is
a collection of proper orderings of odd length or length equal to 2. Because q(C) is not
an integer vector, we can assume without loss of generality that Sk = (i1;¢¢¢;il) for some
odd number l, l ¸ 3. From Assumption 3.2 it follows that in case (i) there exists some j,
1 · j · l, such that
M(ij¡1;ij) + M(ij;ij+1) < M(ij¡1;ij+1);
and in case (ii) there exist j and h between 1 and l with j ¸ h + 2 such that
M(ih;ih+1) + M(ij;ij+1) < M(ih;ij+1) + M(ih+1;ij);
where p ¡ 1 = l when p = 1 and p + 1 = 1 when p = l.
In case (i), we obtain
v(fij¡1;ijg) + v(fij;ij+1g) < v(fij¡1;ij+1g) + 2v(fijg):
If in case (i) it holds that l = 3, take ¹ C = fS1;¢¢¢;Sk¡1; ¹ Sk; ¹ Sk+1g, where ¹ Sk is a proper
reordering of the sequence (ij¡1;ij+1), i.e., ¹ Sk = (ij¡1;ij+1) when ij¡1 < ij+1 and ¹ Sk =
(ij+1;ij¡1) when ij¡1 > ij+1, and ¹ Sk+1 = (ij). Since ¹ C is a collection of proper orderings, the
point q( ¹ C) is an element of W. The di®erence of the value of the dual linear programming
problem at q( ¹ C) and the vertex q(C) equals










Therefore q(C) is not an optimal solution of problem (D).
If in case (i) it holds that l ¸ 5, take ¹ C = fS1;¢¢¢;Sk¡1; ¹ Sk; ¹ Sk+1g, where ¹ Sk is a proper
reordering of the sequence (i1;¢¢¢;ij¡1;ij+1;¢¢¢;il) and ¹ Sk+1 = (ij). Since ¹ C is a collection
of proper orderings, the point q( ¹ C) is an element of W. The di®erence of the value of the











10Therefore q(C) is not an optimal solution of problem (D).
In case (ii), we obtain
v(fih;ih+1g) + v(fij;ij+1g) < v(fih;ij+1g) + v(fih+1;ijg):
If in case (ii) it holds that j = h+2, take ¹ C = fS1;¢¢¢;Sk¡1; ¹ Sk; ¹ Sk+1g, where ¹ Sk is a proper
reordering of the sequence (ih+1;ih+2), i.e., ¹ Sk = (ih+1;ih+2) when ih+1 < ih+2 and ¹ Sk =
(ih+2;ih+1) when ih+1 > ih+2, and ¹ Sk+1 is a proper reordering of (i1;¢¢¢;ih;ih+3;¢¢¢;il).
Since ¹ C is a collection of proper orderings, the point q( ¹ C) is a vertex of W. The di®erence














Therefore q(C) is not an optimal solution of problem (D).
Finally, if in case (ii) it holds that j > h+2, take ¹ C = fS1;¢¢¢;Sk¡1; ¹ Sk; ¹ Sk+1), where ¹ Sk
is a proper reordering of the sequence (i1;¢¢¢;ih;ij+1;¢¢¢;il) and ¹ Sk+1 is a proper reordering
of the sequence (ih+1;¢¢¢;ij). Since ¹ C is a collection of proper orderings, the point q( ¹ C)
is a vertex of W. The di®erence of the value of the dual linear programming problem at













Therefore q(C) is not an optimal solution of problem (D).
This shows that the dual linear programming problem (D) doesn't have any non-integer
optimal solution, and therefore it must have an integer optimal solution. Consequently,
the partnership formation problem has an equilibrium. 2
Next, we investigate what condition can ensure the existence of a complete matching in
equilibrium. A value-function v is said to be super-additive if v(fi;jg) > v(fig) + v(fjg)
for all i;j 2 N, i 6= j. Super-additivity implies that all agents are complementary to
each other, cooperation gives a higher joint value than the sum of the individual values.
The following result asserts that if the value function satis¯es super-additivity, all agents,
except one in case the number of agents is odd, are being matched in equilibrium.
Theorem 3.5 Suppose the value function of the partnership formation problem is
super-additivity. Then, at any equilibrium, there is a complete matching if the number
of agents is even, whereas precisely one agent is not being matched if the number of agents
is odd.
Proof. Suppose n is even, and let (P ¤;r¤) be an equilibrium. If agent i 2 N is an
independent in P ¤, then there must be another independent in P ¤, say, j 2 N, j 6= i. Since
both i and j are independents in P ¤, it holds that r¤
i = v(fig) and r¤
j = v(fjg). But then
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i + r¤
j = v(fig) + v(fjg) < v(fi;jg), which contradicts that (P ¤;r¤) is an equilibrium.
Hence, there can be no independents in P ¤.
Suppose n is odd, and let (P ¤;r¤) be an equilibrium. It is clear that at least one agent
must be an independent in P ¤. If more than one agent is an independent in P ¤, let i and
j be two independents in P ¤. This means that r¤
i = v(fig) and r¤
j = v(fjg). But then
r¤
i +r¤
j = v(fig)+v(fjg) < v(fi;jg), which also contradicts that (P ¤;r¤) is an equilibrium.
Hence, precisely one agent is an independent in P ¤. 2
Finally, we show that the classical assignment problem mentioned in Section 2 can be
formulated as a partnership formation problem satisfying Assumption 3.2. The classical
assignment problem consists of two disjoint groups of agents, N1 and N2. Agents that
belong to the same group cannot be matched. If agent i 2 N1 and agent j 2 N2 are
matched, their value is equal to v(fi;jg). Agents that are not being matched can get some
value by their own, v(fig) for agent i 2 N, where N = N1 [ N2 is the set of all agents.
An equilibrium is then as described before, except that no two agents of the same group
can be matched. To show that this problem ¯ts the framework above, we assign arti¯cially
a value to any pair of agents in a same group. Take any positive number a satisfying
a > 2maxfjv(fi;jg) ¡ v(fig) ¡ v(fjg)jji 2 N1; j 2 N2g, then we de¯ne for any i;j 2 N1
and any i;j 2 N2, j 6= i,
v(fi;jg) = ¡a + v(fig) + v(fjg):
Observe that M(i;j) = ¡a whenever i and j belong to the same group. The next theorem
shows that an equilibrium of this induced partnership formation problem always exists and
is an equilibrium of the assignment problem.
Theorem 3.6 Consider the induced partnership formation problem as described above.
Then this problem satis¯es Assumption 3.2. Therefore it has an equilibrium, and any
equilibrium of it is an equilibrium of the assignment problem.
Proof. To show that the induced partnership formation problem satis¯es Assumption 3.2,
let S = (i1;¢¢¢;il) be a proper ordering on the set N of all agents with l odd and l ¸ 3,
and let T = fi1;¢¢¢;ilg. Suppose that T ½ N1 or T ½ N2. Then M(i1;i2) = M(i2;i3) =
M(i1;i3) = ¡a; and therefore case (i) of Assumption 3.2 is satis¯ed because a > 0. Next,
suppose T \ N1 6= ; and T \ N2 6= ;. Since l is odd and l ¸ 3, there exists j 2 Il such
that ij¡1 and ij in N1 and ij+1 in N2 or such that ij¡1 and ij in N2 and ij+1 in N1, where
j ¡ 1 = l when j = 1 and j + 1 = 1 when j = l. In both cases M(ij¡1;ij) = ¡a and
therefore
M(ij¡1;ij) < ¡2maxfjM(i;j)jji 2 N1; j 2 N2g · M(ij¡1;ij+1) ¡ M(ij;ij+1);
12and so case (i) of Assumption 3.2 is satis¯ed. Hence, from Theorem 3.3 it follows that the
induced partnership formation problem has an equilibrium.
Let (P ¤;r¤) be any equilibrium of the induced partnership formation problem and let
P ¤ = fU¤
1;¢¢¢;U¤
kg. We still have to prove that for all h 2 Ik it holds that if jU¤
hj = 2 then
U¤
h \ N1 6= ; and U¤
h \ N2 6= ;. Suppose U¤
h ½ N1 or U¤
h ½ N2 and let U¤
h = fi1;i2g. From





i2 = v(fi1;i2g) = ¡a + v(fi1g) + v(fi2g) < v(fi1g) + v(fi2g);
because a > 0. On the other hand, in equilibrium it must hold that r¤
i1 ¸ v(fi1g) and
r¤
i2 ¸ v(fi2g), which implies r¤
i1+r¤
i2 ¸ v(fi1g)+v(fi2g), yielding a contradiction. Therefore,
an equilibrium of the induced partnership formation problem is an equilibrium for the
assignment problem. 2
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced the partnership formation problem and proposed an equi-
librium solution for the problem. The equilibrium solution endogenously provides answers
to the question of partnership formation and that of payo® division. We have identi¯ed
necessary and su±cient conditions and established equilibrium existence theorems for the
model. In particular, Assumption 3.2 is very intuitive and general and is satis¯ed by the
classical assignment models.
The current study leaves us with some natural questions. As mentioned earlier, for
the assignment market models studied by Koopmans and Beckmann (1957), Shapley and
Shubik (1972), Crawford and Knoer (1981) have proposed a competitive adjustment process
which mimics the behavior of real competitive markets and ¯nds an equilibrium. It is of
considerable interest and di±culty to develop a similar competitive process that imitates
the behavior of real partnership formation and endogenously yields partnership structure
and payo® distribution in ¯nitely many rounds of negotiations. It is also equally challenging
to investigate what happens when uncertainty or imperfect information is introduced into
the payo® that each agent or each pair of agents can achieve.
References
[1] R.J. Aumann and R.B. Myerson (1988), \Endogenous formation of links between play-
ers and coalitions: an application of the Shapley value," in The Shapley Value: Essays
in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley (A.E. Roth, Ed.), pp. 175-191, Cambridge University
Press, New York.
13[2] L. Ausubel (2006), \An e±cient dynamic auction for heterogeneous commodities,"
American Economic Review, 96, 602-629.
[3] V.P. Crawford and E.M. Knoer (1981), \Job matching with heterogeneous ¯rms and
workers," Econometrica, 49, 437-450.
[4] G.B. Dantzig (1963), Linear Programming and Extensions, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NJ.
[5] F. Gul and E. Stacchetti (1999), \Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes," Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, 87, 95-124.
[6] F. Gul and E. Stacchetti (2000), \The English auction with di®erentiated commodi-
ties," Journal of Economic Theory, 92, 66-95.
[7] S. Hart and M. Kurz (1983), \Endogenous formation of coalitions," Econometrica, 51,
1047-1064.
[8] M. Kaneko and Y. Yamamoto (1986), \The existence and computation of competitive
equilibria in markets with an indivisible commodities," Journal of Economic Theory,
38, 118-136.
[9] A. Kelso and V.P. Crawford (1982), \Job matching coalition formation and gross
substitutes," Econometrica, 50, 1483-1504.
[10] T.C. Koopmans and M. Beckmann (1957), \Assignment problems and the location of
economic activities," Econometrica, 25, 53-76.
[11] P. Milgrom (2000), \Putting auction theory to work: the simultaneous ascending
auction," Journal of Political Economy, 108, 245-272.
[12] M. Ostrovsky (2008), \Stability in supply chain network," American Economic Re-
view, 98, 897-923.
[13] C.Z. Qin (1996), \Endogenous formation of cooperation structures," Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 69, 218-226.
[14] M. Quinzii (1984), \Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities," Interna-
tional Journal of Game Theory, 13, 41-60.
[15] A. Roth and M. Sotomayor (1990), Two-Sided Matching, Cambridge University Press,
New York.
14[16] L.S. Shapley and H. Scarf (1974), \On cores and indivisibilities," Journal of Mathe-
matical Economics, 1, 23-37.
[17] L.S. Shapley and M. Shubik (1972), \The assignment game I: the core," International
Journal of Game Theory, 1, 111-130.
[18] N. Sun and Z. Yang (2006), \Equilibria and indivisibilities: gross substitutes and
complements," Econometrica, 74, 1385-1402.
[19] L.G. Svensson (1983), \Large indivisibilities: an analysis with respect to price equi-
librium and fairness," Econometrica, 51, 939-954.
[20] Y. Yamamoto (1987), \Competitive equilibria in a market with indivisibility," in The
Computation and Modelling of Economic Equilibria (A.J.J. Talman and G. van der
Laan, eds.), pp. 193-204, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
15